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MEMORANDUM
To: JT Date: 29 July, 1996
cc: SM, SDe, MG, SG-J, RB
From: Reg Green Ref:
The Residue of RAG 
(Poverty and All That)
1. In general 1 am enthusiastic about your think piece - especially concentration on national 
plans and, therefore, aspects states/governments can influence and approaches/means they 
can use.
2. 1 have two general points on that theme:
a. specific emphasis on external (weather, war, global economic dynamics) and history 
(war, nature o f government, capacity for governance) as these greatly influence both 
constraints and opportunities as well as priority requirements;
b. household surveys need not be limited to consumption and (at least for makeup o f 
sources) income. Access to health, education, water can be included and - sometimes 
- health, education, agricultural census figures can be melded with them. In addition 
where appropriate supplementary data on time budgets and land access can be sought. 
(A number o f the data sets have gender recording so allow incorporation o f  gender 
aspects.)
3. Safety nets - as proposed at present - is a three person 2 X 2  project involving me as well 
as SM, SDe. Ethiopia/Mozambique and Urban/Rural. Ethiopia has a near empty urban 
box and Mozambique a 350,000 person one (6% to 8% urban population and 12'/2% to 
20% o f these below absolute poverty line) which is relatively low cost, relatively efficient 
(in reaching intended users and being gender conscious by way it identifies and distributes 
- ironically both now accepted as self-evident which was not so at the start). I believe 
programme will go on because its protectors are now key advisor in Health and Minister 
o f  Finance and Planning and the head o f Poverty Alleviation Unit (UAP) its 
catalyser/defender (nominally Social Welfare is present parent) has just been promoted to 
National Director o f Budget (her predecessor at Budget - also a woman - is now Deputy 
Minister for Finance while former Natl. Director who backed UAP is now full time 
Parliamentarian as she is Chair o f Economic Committee of Assembly) and her # 2 who 
took over at UAP is very good.
• On rural Ethiopia is much more innovative and links food and
reconstruction/livelihood rebuilding much better. Mozambique has just begun -
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interestingly political pressure is to ruralise urban "food supplement" which won't work 
so was advising the then UAP head (now promoted) on what might when she was on 
course here earlier this year.
•  These factors suggest: Mozambique will continue to be interesting (real political and 
official backing - not least because urban food supplement may have been key to 
FRELIMO's absolute majority in Assembly even though we didn't devise and defend it 
for that reason and I think technical political economists saw vote implications sooner 
than politicians).
•  The historical reasons for E/M contrasts should be interesting. Present Ethiopian 
government comes out o f  rural uprising in degraded, drought vulnerable, war 
devastated rural area and virtually assumes as self-evident that survival food is used to 
cover wages o f reconstruction public works. It did not hold major towns until very 
late and its grassroots urban (or at least Addis) reticulation (as well as articulation) is 
weak so urban action has not had same imbedded priority. In Mozambique, 
government held cities throughout war and felt need to prove it cared about human 
investment and dignity in which areas it could act. (There was urban bias over 75-82 
but 82-92 was much more full urban but limited rural reach.) Rural was pure survival 
and works would (with limited exceptions, which were taken up, e.g. an ILO 
facilitated labour intensive highway) have attracted attack and dispersed security forces 
dangerously. Current thinking is rural oriented, but not on IMF's line (drop the urban 
down to boost rural) but rather on (USAID's plus one fraction o f Bank's) hold line on 
urban for now and put additions on rural generalising from what has worked in urban 
areas. In towns FRELIMO (a catch as low levels o f local governance and data 
collection have been party and may be hard to convert to government albeit 75% to 
90% FRELIMO vote in all cities except Beira may ease this) has had good two way 
communication and good (if simple) data at neighbourhood (carteiro) level and below. 
Rural is very much weaker not least because 40% to 60% o f rural population have 
"gone home" so aren't where they were in 1992.
Specific Comments
1 - Para 2. Yes, both the Ethiopian (rural) and Mozambican (urban) experience demonstrate 
Kothari's point. Initiative was not international NGOs, but politicians (M) or quasi political 
technocracy (E), and donors have been won over rather than initially pushing.
Page 3. I am less pessimistic on household surveys showing dynamics o f impoverishment or - 
at least - pressure points for policy to help households to  survive and enable to climb out. 
(Perhaps I am biased war/drought interaction and ratchet effects o f repetitive shocks with very 
cobwebby safety nets have been keys to down dynamic. Hellish that is but complicated no.)
In Mozambique - especially urban - 'women' is not a very good correlate. Single adult 
households with several dependants are in fact 99% female headed, but the bottom line is 
hands to mouths ratio. And female income distribution (urban) appears bimodal - one group 
at bottom but (smaller) one in bottom o f top 20% - nurses, teachers, top part of'informal' 
trade, some "green zone" co-op members. These tend to have small households (one 
woman/one child) so female headed average per capita not notably below overall average.
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(That I think is counterintuitive. May well not apply in Addis where female access even as 
secretaries and primary teachers/nurses is 25 years behind Mozambique, 30 behind Tanzania, 
perhaps 40-50 behind West Africa. I do not mean it will necessarily take that long to catch 
up. Lead woman minister - niece o f Hailie Selassie, ex-Trotskyite, imprisoned by HS and 
nearly assassinated by Dergue - is a practical gadfly on gender in main line programmes and 
apparently influential. With revisionist partial rehabilitation of HS and her appeal to  both 
traditionalists for whom she is senior survivor and radicals -w ho  remember past stances and 
courage - Amhara they need her.)
Page 4 - Para 3. Yes, but who dangerous and/or undeserving poor are depends very much on 
political leaders' perspectives.
In Ethiopia ex-Mengistu army and police are seen as undeserving albeit they are not 
systematically excluded from rural programmes. So apparently are at least Addis urban poor 
(Tigre-Oromo-Somali zones are not very urban). The urban are particularly the Amhara who 
are 'undeserving' by definition to the 'tripartite' ruling coalition. But undeserving means no 
preferences to what is seen as elite group not persecution - higher civil service and university 
still have their Amhara majorities and 'affirmative action' is on lines o f quasi confederal region 
creation (and their lower/middle public services) not a ratissage from centre.
• Amhara are seen as potentially dangerous but not, as yet at least, actively. Banning 
'return to our rule' (odd melange o f Mengistu/Menelik or maybe not so odd, basically 
Mengistu was the last emperor o f New Empire whose false start - thanks to UK - was 
Tewedros and clear founder Menelik!) party and security service information collection 
not severe repression to date.
• Mozambique is quite different. All poor are perceived as'deserving'. Up to 1992 
arguably all poor accessible to government were seen as victims o f Renamo (albeit 
displaced in one province heavily supported Renamo and in three more Renamo probably 
had plurality - or close to it - among them, a fact o f which government was well aware 
whatever its PR stance), but (contrary to mythology) government wanted more food aid 
to Renamo controlled or cut off civilians from at least 1987, so long as delivery assured 
60% plus went to civilians (Red Cross permitted to go on even though 75% plus to 
Renamo troops!). It was international NGOs who were totally negative. And in run up to 
cease-fire government leaned very hard on UNICEF/WFP (and provided data suggesting 
good intelligence on who/where) to feed both civilians and ex-combatants on Renamo 
side.
• Ex-combatants (both sides) are seen as dangerous (armed) poor. But government is as 
sick o f violence as 99% o f Mozambicans. So it wanted to have $200 million (pledged at 
Rome but $20 million delivered partly because UNDP balked at Mozambique-UN 
Humanitarian led, Bank backed approach articulated with little reference to UNDP who 
were seen as o f low competence) to reintegrate into economy. A bit 'classist' - tools, 
seeds, housing materials, transport home, 2 years pay for other ranks, a light lorry for a 
lieutenant, etc., but basis was that officers could be more dangerous as gang leaders (not 
least some o f government army ones who had experience as a 'second occupation').
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• I am not sure why perceptions differed. FRELIMO was much more an electoral/broad 
support/civilian political group than present Ethiopian government whose civilian 
politics begin in earnest in 1993 not 1962 And it foresaw a close election (indeed it had 
real fear it would lose on 'they can't stop war' vote). On the other side, Ethiopia for up to 
five centuries (recorded) has had weak kin safety nets (Amhara families are almost as 
fragile as modern European) and governments who did not see safety nets as on the 
agenda for both feasibility and priority reasons. (Amhara feudalism has been nationalist, as 
symbolised by Battle o f  Aduwa, but not noblesse oblige as symbolised by repetitive mass 
famine deaths over 1920-1972 when these had become quite unusual in rest o f SSA.) This 
government has them on priority agenda (at least rural - urban I'm less sure) but not as 
high as Mozambique.
Page 5 - Para 3. Yes, albeit it is perceived credible threat (even if not real) and including 
electoral one. Tanzanian MP's have seen rural poor as threat to careers these 30 years.
Rightly so as fairly open primaries, two leaders on to general election, 20% to 40%
'retirement' o f  rural MPs each election! Part o f M-E difference is lesser belief in E that 
difference is lesser belief in E that state can make significant difference except (this is new) on 
averting famine. Now very much see drought as inevitable, famine as a national 
(governmental) disgrace and put it in those terms. (Perhaps this explains apparent urban 
indifference? Addis has not been marked by apparent mass food intake shortfall mortality, 
albeit morbidity might show a different picture.)
Page 9 - Para 2. In practice both M and E have opted for Sen approach. Food for 
survival, access to primary education and health services (esp. preventative) come first. The 
education in particular relates to belief survival o f household can enable at least the children 
("The flowers that do not wither" - Samora) to emerge from absolute poverty. Ethiopia has 
the same approach. Three strands seem less integrated in Ethiopia, but food is tied more 
closely to infrastructure investment to increase incomes o f  poor and productivity o f rural poor 
and not so poor.
Neither country is good trade-off test. In both higher %  to Universal Access to Basic 
Services/enhanced Productivity o f Poor People/Safety Net Access Provision arguably would 
increase both GDP growth and buoyancy o f  transport-commerce-manufacturing. The M 
trade-offs are versus large forex focused transit traffic-mining-tourism where state supposes 
private sector has a comparative advantage in commerce-manufacturing and is not so sure 
finance for rail-port-telecom is in direct competition with basic services/poverty reduction for 
state's external fund mobilisation capacity. Namibia is arguably a trade-off test. The 
economic quadrilateral - commercial livestock/fish/metal/diamonds - directly employ 80,000 
households o f 250,000-300,000. The 150,000 odd absolutely poor households are about one- 
third urban unemployable within existing economic structure (or more accurately employable 
only at very low productivity) and two-thirds rural equally not fitting present economic 
structure (suitable - for them - land doesn't exist or lacks water). Should state subsidise 
growth sectors (e.g. via 'stock capital' in power, transport, communication, middle and high 
level training providing free or part cost services)? Or should it assume they can pay and use 
its resources on rural livelihood, labour intensive works, health-education-household water 
plus (existing) old age pension? Or - realistically - where should it put balance point? It has in 
fact been nearer second and has low (3%-4%) growth since 60% households = under 5%
GDP. Would 'stock capital' spending really speed up fisheries and mining recovery? I rather 
doubt - animal spirits o f  entrepreneurs and global prospects seem more influential.
4
- Para 3 Yes, but.. If 110 fish today he/she won't survive to learn to fish tomorrow.
The dead have no future (or at any rate none relevant to state policy). In practice least 
hopeful candidates for enhanced productivity do not get access to even poorest o f poor 
oriented programmes. For example, Maputo Mother Child Health clinics reach 90% and are 
free. (Some o f 10% are not poor - use private care.) The poor mothers who don't come are 
poorer child carers, i.e. personal negative selection probably closely correlated to being "least 
able to make such investments fructify".
Re international agencies - do they really create a priority for anti-poverty thrust or even 
dominate the conceptualisation of what comes first? I doubt Not in Ghana (PAMSCAD 
was put in train by a fraction o f Ghana elite with access to JR plus UNICEF) nor in 
Mozambique (Finance-Health-PM-President with relevant international agency on articulation 
again UNICEF). Nor I think in Ethiopia where Bank/bilaterals are less policy influential and 
international NGOs seen as much as a plague o f locusts as o f bearers o f locust control 
resources and interim food supplies. The catalyst seems to have been Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission higher technocracy. The 'last Emperor' (Comrade Ras Mengistu) created it to 
improve image his regime's image and to collect funds abroad, but RRC was sincere, able, 
outspoken (and got in trouble for it). It became core o f new regime's anti poverty thrust since 
Tigrean ad hoc wartime efforts had little institutional base. Food aid (but sometimes 
creatively commercialised on national initiative) is too much the international instrument o f 
choice and does tend to survival focus but - e.g. Ethiopia - can be linked to productivity 
enhancing, a la Kothari quote - a serious poverty reduction programme suggests a serious 
national concern (that's perhaps why some countries have none!). Because external actors 
lack clear ideas what is to be done there is more room for national manoeuvre than in most 
areas. Incidentally why assume that - at least in SSA - concern for poorest (especially but not 
only own extended family and household) is lower than in Europe? I'd tend to argue reverse.
Page 10 - e - Para 1. Err... except among pastoralists, poor households have very few 
saleable assets to run down. That has up side. Assets used to survive are not available to 
'snap back'. Pastoralists are noticeably more often ratcheted out o f livelihood because "The 
rains have brought back the grass but they will not bring back my dead camels" as a Somali 
pastoralist put it in 1987. (Diversification o f income sources I agree, albeit it is often a 
sensible strategy for reasons other than vulnerability insurance).
- Para 2. Biggest 'influence' is whether it allows household to stay put so it can snap back.
If  the households have to move regaining livelihood is much harder. Botswana and Tanzania 
are both good at this and I'm not sure the mixed employment guarantee/clinic provision 
approach in B and the maize plus beans plus seed in declared emergency (usually drought but 
also flood) Districts to each non-waged household's senior female do alter coping 
differentially. (They used to because hirers in Botswana usually didn't give access to women 
until ordered to do so, at which point they did as directed with no evident shortage o f 
applicants nor any significant social opposition.)
Page 11 - g I think part o f  confusion is conflating gender strictu sensu and hands to 
mouths ratio. Most female headed households are much worse off on the h/m test because 
(at least in SSA) adult male/no adult female/several dependants is a near empty box. This is 
quite different from differential access to land and to knowledge of how to use animal power 
(e.g. for ploughing or transporting). Doubtless all are social constructs and all impoverish but
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conceptually and in terms of action the first is unlike the other two. (One cannot usefully 
seek to dish out healthy, family supporting husbands!)
- h. Urbanisation of Poverty It is hard to compare like with like on available data. Rural 
self-provisioning for food tends to be valued at farmgate (headed out) prices and for housing 
at farmgate (headed in) construction materials. The same amount o f food (and probably 
housing albeit there complex qualitative issues arise) at urban retail would usually cost 2 to 5 
times as much. Very few household studies seek to account, nor per contra do they subtract 
necessary urban costs (especially transport fares and - arguably - purchased fuel and water. 
However, when those are gathered they - i.e. their time costs - are left out o f rural household 
income as well as 'expenditure'). There are African data suggesting lower malnutrition among 
children and lower overall morbidity for urban poor but how much is personal income and 
how much less poor access to preventative-educational-simple curative health services and to 
pure water is unclear. It may (unfortunately) become clearer as urban population grows and 
the new or vastly expanded exurbs have as little access as rural areas.
•  "more anomic and violent" may be true as a generalisation. But it varies not just widely 
but wildly by city and country. Dar es Salaam is not anomic and not very violent, ditto 
Maputo. Jo'burg is mixed on anomic but almost incredibly violent. (That appears to be 
exclusion: too many black young men believe life - including their own - is o f little value 
leading to making violence a first resort. Apparently parallels exist in Brazil.) Most (not 
all) poor wards in Lusaka and Nairobi are nearer Jo'burg than Dar. But the greatest 
violence in SA is in Kwa Zulu-Natal rural and peri urban and is not anomistic just as worst 
genocide in Rwanda and now Burundi has been rural and is hardly the result o f anomie - 
au contraire. That extended family and community o f origin community safety nets fray 
and even rot away under stress in urban areas is well and broadly documented. Why in 
some cases new forms o f social cohesion develop, but are usually are limited in 
coverage (either as to membership - e.g. women fish dryers in Accra or women "green 
zone" co-operators in Maputo - or area - e.g. a handful o f wards/townships around 
Lusaka) is less understood
W ar clearly affects rural areas most even when fairly straight line (e.g. Eritrea/Ethiopia) 
and especially when mass terrorism attempting to make rural life impossible and to starve 
out cities is practised (rebels in Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and - to a degree - 
government in Angola). In particular rural service and safety net access disintegrate or 
(e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone) vanish.
 next to last para o f h on feminisation. Eh? Women have - intriguingly - better
livelihood access now than in 1960 or 1970 and - probably - 1980. This is especially true in 
urban areas (and especially outside West Africa where female entry into urban economy is 
much older). This is true at all income levels and is welcome. Not all shifts to multiple 
significant household earnings including from adult females are the result o f dire poverty. This 
tends (whether shift is by choice, by consumerism or by need) to raise relative status as well 
as workload o f women. As many new women's solidarity groups are occupation related, it 
apparently also generates new community relations structures
While it is true that outside very small scale commerce most informal sector earners are 
w aged employees, this is less true of women. They have a disproportionately high share o f 
very small scale commerce (often an outworker type o f putting out with risk largely put out
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too - goods on credit in morning, pay up at night). As most urban households have 
multiple incomes (i.e. both formal and so-called informal, more accurately unrecorded) 
dividing households formal/informal makes little sense In Nairobi, Harare, Dar, Maputo 
and probably Accra, most households have one recorded (formal) wage job and two or more 
unrecorded (informal) streams. Nor - depending what one means - are informal income 
streams necessarily much below unskilled formal wages. Indeed, they are often well above 
many government wage rates. The rock bottom earnings are for 'no entry barrier' sink 
activities - and the ability o f poor people (e.g. women gravel hand crushers and street side 
vendors, male shoe shiners in Maputo) to erect functioning barriers to entry is surprisingly 
high. For last resort activities earnings often are a tiny fraction o f unskilled wage, but also o f 
income streams o f most o f  informal sector.
- last para o f h - Is the infrastructure/health trade-off that clear? Standpipe water and 
sanitation are health linked. Housing may (more weakly) be, but is clearly beyond substantial 
state upgrading. Visibility of urban poor may, in part, be more a function o f  elite attitudes 
than a cause. Nairobi absolutely poor are hard to see - a new highway means 'gentrification' o f 
adjacent areas by moving absolutely poor off to remain invisible. Greater visibility in Dar and 
M aputo (where government would not consider Nairobi type clearance - nor get away with it 
if it did) seems related to greater sense o f common humanity and higher priority to get primary 
education, health services, standpipe water into poor as well as other areas. Dakar has 
decanted its poor to Pekine these 30 years so by now that is number two 'city' o f Senegal with 
next to no services and 'safely' out o f sight, and night presence, o f residents in Dakar. Accra is 
somewhat nearer Dar than Dakar but Nima-Mamobi and (now, not 1965) Ushertown while 
on and very visible from main routes are rarely visited by non poor who pass by. Addis has 
urban poor everywhere (even hotel back yards) but no evident priority to  acting.
The resource allocations most clearly doubtful on production gain grounds are Safety Nets
for unempowerable (drought impact alleviation and reduction ones arguably have high, 
relatively quick payoff). Even here it can be argued that to the extent they enable children to 
grow up more productive they do have a medium term growth payoff. For aged and 
handicapped with no children (or severely handicapped children) the case is basically "moral 
economy" (Smith) or religious ("Inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least o f  these my 
brethren"). But the belief that a society which rejects such claims is failing in a basic way is 
pretty cross cultural and certainly is deep-rooted in most (not all) o f  SSA even if not in the 
same terms as either Bismarckian or post 1945 Western "welfare states". The differences 
relate to historic family duty strength and to whether national feeling does see nation as an 
extended family and state as head o f household. And yet again, while Bismarck was basically 
in business o f outflanking social democrats his safety nets were - at the least - not inconsistent 
with enhanced macro growth.
5 - Conclusion - But Indonesia's rapid reduction o f absolute poverty long post-dates rapid 
growth. The rural extension-seed-basic health services-education-household water (including 
small scale irrigation) and (up to a point) competitive market access thrust in Java (and for 
Javanese settlers decanted to have access to land and/or to enforce creeping genocide, e.g. W. 
Irian, E. Timor) is more recent and seems both temporally, logically and (on micro studies) 
causally linked to poverty reduction. It also seems to be more GDP grow th efficient than 
earlier state uses o f hydrocarbon surpluses. That is "intelligent state intervention". Arguably a 
drive to UABS (universal access to basic services) and to enabling PPP (poor person 
productivity) growth as well as universal SNAP (safety net access provision) can be cost
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efficient (better labour force in future and now, time - especially women and girls - freed to 
produce goods from, e.g. fuelling, watering, high marginal output/enabling investment ratios 
for poor households, faster/fuller post calamity recovery) in respect to GDP growth. This is 
especially true if urban production is constrained by rural income/supply of food and inputs 
deficiencies, i.e. effective demand is much too low to use nominally extant and at full 
capacity use arguably efficient urban sector production units This may help explain 
'plateauing' o f  relatively successful SA. For example, Ghana has grown 5% a year (though 
may be falling back to 4%) and Tanzania 4%. But clawback only. Arguably because with 
reductions in state and external deficits very little GDP per capita consumption growth to 
which low productivity-low effective demand-low supply o f inputs to urban and/or urban 
medium-large scale sector by poor people 'contribute' massively. This may help explain very 
poor domestic investment from domestic sources recovery - demand not buoyant enough to 
justify. As noted above I doubt action - as opposed to rhetoric - in SSA is internationally 
driven. It is internationally constrained - UABS is in practice supported very half-heartedly 
and PPP de facto very little indeed. The Emperor has sketches and some cloth for new clothes 
but no pattern so no clothes. To extent poor country elites do prioritise poverty reduction and 
work up plausible patterns they can get some cloth to cut to patterns pretty close to what they 
propose, albeit with danger T-shirt and underpants only (no sandals or trousers/skirts let alone 
protection from rain!).
Conclusion. Hope these reflections are o f some interest/catalytic value. As is evident I think 
UABS-PPP-SNAP tripod can link macro/micro and poverty reduction/growth raising. While 
the broad model is general the national contexts (including ways global, contexts impact on 
national) mean prioritisation (overall and within UABS-PPP-SNAP), articulation, operation, 
payoff levels and rates are likely to vary substantially.
- RHG
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